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effects of combat operations. In addition,
his research seems to suggest that sustained, well-planned strikes may be more
important than the sudden mass attacks
designed to produce “shock and awe”
that are heralded by many network-centricwarfare advocates.
Additional useful chapters review the
ethical considerations arising in information warfare and examine whether
or not such mechanisms as arms control
and export regimes can apply to
information warfare technologies. An article by Francis Fukuyama and Abram N.
Shulsky reviews the lessons (familiar to a
Naval War College audience) that the
military can learn from business in
adapting to the information age.
One minor complaint—the book does
not offer biographical sketches of the
contributors. A few pages devoted to that
information would be more useful than
the largely unnecessary listing of abbreviations and acronyms. Overall, this collection is useful, but a better introduction to
many of these concepts is found in an
earlier RAND work by John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age
(1997) [reviewed in the Spring 1999
issue].
ERIC J. DAHL

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Szayna, Thomas S. Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998. 329pp. $25

Since 1989, the U.S. military has been involved in a number of intrastate conflicts
integrally related to ethnicity. These ethnic conflicts have been devastating to
those involved; the conflicts contributed
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to regional destabilization; and they have
been assumed to breed international terrorism. Most saliently, they have virtually
destroyed the hope of peace benefits that
were predicted to accrue at the end of the
Cold War.
The intelligence community was tasked
by the State and Defense Departments to
provide explanations for ethnic conflict.
Indications-and-warning systems were to
be developed and used to alert policy and
military decision makers to impending
crises. It was assumed that good analysis
and prediction would contribute to policies and practices designed to prevent,
manage, or contain ethnic conflict and
thereby minimize damage to international peace and stability. A number of
studies were conducted internally or were
outsourced. The task was apparently, but
deceptively, simple—produce a predictive model of ethnic conflict. The criterion for a successful model was equally
simple—did it work? That is, did the
model provide more information of a
critical nature than could be provided by
country experts, and was it available in a
timely fashion?
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict is the
public report of research sponsored by
the deputy chief of staff for intelligence
of the U.S. Army. It was produced by a
group at the top level at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California.
The stated purpose of the project was to
help the intelligence community order its
thinking about the logic and dynamics of
ethnic conflict and to systematize
information-collection requirements.
The authors did not provide a comprehensive explanation of ethnic conflict but
attempted to answer the questions of
how ethnic mobilization occurs and under what conditions it leads to violence.
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The research was based on the assumption that reliance on static indicators and
simple statistical correlation (as found in
many other models) did not adequately
account for change. Change was assumed
to be the political mobilization of “ethnic
factors used to aggregate and articulate
group grievances.” Political mobilization
was assumed to be found in changes between and among groups in economic,
political, and social spheres of life activities. In other words, they were looking
for specific changes in the relationship
between group and state that could signal
future conflict.
Three stages were identified: Potential for
Strife, Transformation from Potential to
Likely Strife, and From Likely to Actual
Strife. The potential for strife was identified in processes associated with closure,
that is, the reification of group boundaries, the strengthening of “us-them”
thinking. The transformation from potential to likely strife—critical to the conceptual framework—was found in the
mobilization of ethnic-political identity
influencing the balance of power between
a group and the state. This transformation was assumed to be found in factors
associated with emerging leadership, mobilization of group resources, and a series
of “tipping” events (similar to the “trigger mechanisms” found in other studies).
Change from likely to actual strife occurred through an interactive strategic
bargaining process; this was portrayed by
assessing the group preferences and capabilities of the state and the contending
ethnic groups, presented in tabular form.
The model was then applied to Yugoslavia,
South Africa, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia.
The best part of the model is its focus on
change and process. The authors probably have that right—most ethnic groups,
under most conditions, live in relative
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peace and harmony; changes in
relationships are generally associated
with competition and conflict under conditions of relative scarcity. But, however
good this assumption, the model was not
adequately developed to test the hypothesis on a variety of cases. The variables, as
discussed in this publication, were very
general; they need further specification
and elaboration. The four case studies,
which purported to apply the model,
were written by situation experts. They
are very informative and make good
reading. Nevertheless, the writing seemed
to reflect the authors’ expertise and perspectives as much as any application of
the model.
If, then, the goal was to provide a model
that could apply statistical methodology
to comparative data and thereby contribute to predicting future ethnic conflicts,
it was not accomplished. Most of the
conclusions seemed drawn from the
analyses provided by RAND’s experts and
not produced by the operationalization of
the concepts or an application of the
model to the four cases. Perhaps because
this was a public document, the actual
data lies elsewhere and the model has
greater specificity and applicability than
appear in this short text.
The critical test of any model is whether
it works—whether it provides more predictive power than an informed observer.
In this case, it is hard to say, because as
the authors note, “the model needs further specification and elaboration.” This
will not be the final book on ethnic
conflict.
As the consultants’ favorite saying goes:
“Progress has been made, but further research is necessary.”
PAULETTA OTIS

University of Southern Colorado
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